By: Paul Sarran
January 7, 2025
The government of Trinidad and Tobago has declared a State of Emergency (SoE) to address the sharp escalation in gang-related violence, particularly in East Port of Spain and other crime-prone areas across the country. This move comes in the wake of heightened criminal activity, with recent murders and retaliatory attacks gripping the nation and raising public alarm. The declaration of the SoE on December 30, 2024, empowers law enforcement agencies with enhanced powers to search and detain suspects, as well as mobilizing military forces to aid in policing efforts. Despite this intensified response, questions linger about the effectiveness of these measures and the government’s broader strategy for addressing crime.
One of the most contentious aspects of this SoE is the decision not to impose a curfew, a standard feature in past emergency measures. Acting Attorney General Stuart Young defended this omission, emphasizing that the government is striving to balance public safety with minimal disruption to daily life. However, this decision has prompted skepticism, as many wonder whether curfews might have added an extra layer of control over criminal activities, particularly during the late-night hours when many crimes occur. The government’s stance appears to prioritize preserving citizens’ freedom during end-of-year celebrations, but this raises questions about whether such flexibility might undermine the full effectiveness of the emergency measures.
The surge in violence in Trinidad and Tobago is attributed in part to the proliferation of high-powered firearms, including AR-15s and AK-47s, which are increasingly being used in gang conflicts. Some observers have speculated about whether the SoE is linked to the arrest of Calvin “Tyson” Lee, an alleged community leader in Port of Spain. Although Lee has faced legal scrutiny in the past there is no direct evidence to suggest his arrest is the driving force behind the SoE. The SoE appears to be a broader response to a general rise in gang activity rather than a specific reaction to any one individual or incident.
The government’s approach, while bold, raises several critical questions. What benchmarks will be used to evaluate the success of the SoE? Will it be judged on the number of arrests, the quantity of weapons seized, or a tangible reduction in violent crimes? Additionally, how will the government ensure that these enhanced powers are not misused, particularly in vulnerable communities where tensions between law enforcement and residents often run high? Clear oversight mechanisms and transparency in operations are essential to maintain public trust and avoid allegations of abuse.
Furthermore, while the SoE may temporarily suppress criminal activity, there is widespread acknowledgment that it does not address the underlying issues fueling crime in Trinidad and Tobago. Poverty, unemployment, and social inequality remain persistent challenges, particularly in communities most affected by gang violence. Without parallel efforts to improve access to education, job opportunities, and social services, the SoE risks being a short-term fix rather than a sustainable solution.
To complement the SoE, the government could consider implementing additional measures such as targeted curfews in high-crime areas, a comprehensive gun amnesty program, and stronger community engagement initiatives. By working with community leaders, religious organizations, and NGOs, the government could foster trust and collaboration in neighbourhoods where law enforcement often faces resistance. A focus on mediation and conflict resolution could also help to de-escalate tensions and reduce the likelihood of retaliatory violence.
As Trinidad and Tobago grapples with this crisis, the broader regional context cannot be ignored. The Caribbean as a whole has been facing rising crime rates, fueled by a combination of economic pressures, weak border controls. Trinidad and Tobago must take the lead in advocating for greater regional cooperation, including intelligence sharing and joint operations to tackle these shared challenges.
The SoE also highlights the need for a robust post-emergency plan. Once the heightened powers are lifted, what steps will the government take to ensure that the progress made under the SoE is not undone? Sustained police presence in hotspot areas, investment in community policing initiatives, and the development of rehabilitation programmes for offenders are critical components of a long-term strategy to build safer communities.
Ultimately, the success of this SoE will depend not only on its immediate outcomes but also on the government’s ability to address the root causes of crime and violence. Citizens remain hopeful but cautious, aware that while emergency measures may bring temporary relief, lasting peace will require deeper systemic change. As the situation unfolds, the government must remain vigilant, responsive, and transparent, demonstrating that its commitment to tackling crime goes beyond the current crisis.
(Paul Sarran is a Political Science Student at the University of the West Indies Global Campus in St. Augustine.)
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